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ASSAULT ON ANOTHER CITADEL: ATTEMPTS
TO CURTAIL THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD
OF LOYALTY APPLICABLE TO
CORPORATE DIRECTORS
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON*
INTRODUCTIONO VER the last twenty years, corporation law has become increasingly
enabling.' Under the modem view, corporate statutes represent no
more than standard form contracts. State statutes set forth off-the-rack
rules that govern corporations' internal affairs unless the incorporating
parties have provided otherwise in articles of incorporation, bylaws or
comprehensive shareholders' agreements. The modern corporation stat-
ute's sole function is to approximate the corporate structure the incorpo-
rating parties would have bargained for, absent transaction costs.2 Gone
are the days when corporate laws contained numerous substantive Do's
and Don'ts.
The question that arises is what brackets should exist around the
movement toward private ordering. Traditionally, the venerable com-
mon law fiduciary duties of care and of loyalty have limited individuals'
freedom to act within corporations.' Common law fiduciary duties have
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. B.A. 1965, University of Notre
Dame; J.D. 1970, Northwestern University School of Law; L.L.M. 1974, University of
Virginia School of Law. I thank persons who were kind enough to share with me their
thoughts about an earlier draft of this Article: Peter Carstensen, John C. Coffee, Michael
P. Dooley, Charles R. O'Kelley, Robert W. Hamilton, Roberta Romano and Joel
Seligman.
1. This modem era might be said to date from the 1967 revision of the Delaware
General Corporate Law. Professor Folk, a reporter of the 1967 Delaware revision, has
noted that "[a]lmost without exception, the key movement in corporation law revisions is
towards ever greater permissiveness .... Explicitly positing an objective of 'flexibility,'
statutory revisers in the most recent period have usually sought to enlarge the ambit of
freedom of corporate management to take whatever action it may wish." Folk, Some
Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 Conn. B.J. 409, 410 (1968).
2. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
3. The most cited reason for eliminating substantive content from corporate statutes
has been the backup of common law fiduciary duty. For example, in the exposure drafts
leading to the 1985 revision of the influential American Bar Association Model Business
Corporation Act, the existence of fiduciary duty was the principal argument used to sup-
port removal of restrictions on corporate directors' powers, inter alia, to approve loans to
officers and directors, to redeem common shares, to issue shares for future services or
promissory notes, to eliminate preemptive rights, to amend articles of incorporation with-
out shareholder vote, to revalue corporate assets, and to declare dividends and make
distributions. See Branson, Countertrends in Corporation Law: Model Business Corpora-
tion Act Revision, British Company Law Reform, and Principles of Corporate Governance
and Structure, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 53, 70-72 (1983).
Courts, too, have held fiduciary duty to be the boundary. For example, in the area of
corporate combinations, courts have held that contract terms such as "no shop," "best
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operated to strike down transactions even when no discrete statutory
prohibition has intervened.4 As corporate law has become increasingly
enabling, however, fiduciary duty has taken on another purpose: the de-
lineation of the boundaries beyond which parties to an incorporated ven-
ture, or a majority of them, cannot go in private ordering arrangements.
Heightened in its importance, fiduciary duty is now threatened by a
movement toward permitting corporations to opt out of liability for di-
rectors' breaches of the duty of care. Noted commentary has even rec-
ommended abolition of the common law duty of care altogether.5 From
1986 to 1988, well over thirty states amended corporation statutes to per-
mit individual corporations to opt out of liability for duty of care viola-
tions.6 The directors of corporations that opt out are no longer liable in
damages for negligence. To varying degrees, these statutes constitute a
de facto abolition of the duty of care.7
More troubling, however, august authority has advocated elimination
of the duty of loyalty by permitting shareholder majorities to remove
fiduciary duty limitations upon self-dealing transactions by corporate
managers.' Although no state has followed this recommendation, a re-
efforts" and "cancellation fee" cannot override the responsibility of target company direc-
tors to act in the best interests of the corporation. See infra notes 77-79 and accompany-
ing text.
4. See, e.g., Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407-08 (Del. 1985) (fidu-
ciary duty prevented directors' issuance of shares to employee stock ownership plan in
order to perpetuate themselves in office); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498
A.2d 1099, 1107 (Del. 1985) (fiduciary duty invoked to block transaction even though by
reverse implication contract between related parties permitted challenged transaction);
Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 1982) (shareholders' right to vote
cannot be frustrated by perpetual shareholder deadlock that entrenches existing board of
directors); Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975) (fiduciary
duties prevented redemption of shares to perpetuate control even though articles of incor-
poration authorized redemption).
5. See, eg., Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 261, 262-63
(1986) (imposition of liability rules may not be desirable); Scott, Corporation Law and the
American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 927, 937 (1983)
(legal duty rule should be abolished).
6. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
7. See Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 1987); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.307
(West Supp. 1988); infra note 31. At least one state has changed the standard itself from
that of an objective, reasonable person to a purely subjective standard. Compare Va.
Code Ann. § 13.1-690(A) (1985) ("A director shall discharge his duties as a director...
in accordance with his good faith business judgment of the best interests of the corpora-
tion.") with 2 Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.30(a), at 926 (3d ed. 1985) ("A director
shall discharge his duties... with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances."). See generally Comment, Limiting Corpo-
rate Directors' Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the Directors'
Duty of Care, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 239, 269-72 (1987) (Virginia and Indiana statutes pres-
ent drastic changes in the standard of care itself rather than in limitation of director
liability).
8. See, e.g., N. Wolfson, The Modem Corporation 151 (1984) (duty of loyalty a
"weak basis.., on which to rest the legitimacy of the government of the mega-corpora-
tion"); Fischel & Bradley, supra note 5, at 290-91 (duty of loyalty inadequate to prevent
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cent Model Business Corporation Act amendment by the American Bar
Association does attempt to go part of the way. 9
Without articulated brackets around private ordering, the legal bound-
ary presumably is simple majoritarian shareholder rule,"° which recent
events in the political sphere have brought under scrutiny." In the polit-
ical realm, constitutions not only impose structure but also restrict the
authoritarianism of majority rule. Although the analogy of corporation
statutes to constitutions may be flawed, the parallels between economic
and political associations are numerous enough to warrant a
comparison. 12
This Article focuses upon proposals to permit corporations to opt out
of applicability of the common law duty of loyalty to corporate offi-
cials." Part I of this Article discusses the recommendations and enact-
ments that have permitted corporations to opt out of liability for
violations of fiduciary duty, and compares the economic and legal dis-
tinctions between the duties of care and loyalty. Part II shows that a
corporate world devoid of the duty of loyalty will resemble a spoils sys-
any but the most obvious breaches); see also infra notes 15-26 and accompanying text
(comments of Judge Easterbrook).
9. See Committee on Corp. Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-
Amendments Pertaining to Director's Conflicting Interest Transactions, 43 Bus. Law. 691,
695-96 (1988); infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
10. Some jurisdictions still require a two-thirds shareholder vote to amend articles of
incorporation. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 10-4-149 (1987); Alaska Stat. § 10.10.110 (1985).
The decided trend, however, is toward requiring a mere majority. See, e.g., 3 Model
Business Corp. Act Ann. § 10.03(e), at 1168.1 (3d ed. 1985) (unless the MBCA, articles
of incorporation or board of directors requires otherwise, majority vote of those "entitled
to be cast" is sufficient to amend articles of incorporation).
11. See Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, New York Review of Books, Aug. 13, 1987,
at 3, 10 (Supreme Court nominee criticized because his "reading of the Constitution...
flirts with the radical populist thesis that minorities.., have no moral rights against the
majority at all.").
12. Under the contractarian view of corporate law, unbridled majoritarian rule does
not exist because corporations and their managers operate in markets. Market forces
limit majoritarian rule and act as adequate brackets around private ordering arrange-
ments. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
13. In accord with the modem view of corporate law generally, opt out proposals for
various forms of corporate regulation have become widespread. SEC Commissioner Jo-
seph Grundfest proposed that target companies be permitted to opt out of application of
the SEC's tender offer regulations. See Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for
Corporate Control, Exchange Act Release No. 23,486, [36 SEC Docket 230, 237-38]
(July 31, 1986); Victor, A Brash Young SEC Commissioner, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 10, 1986, at
1, 30. The SEC later reported that of twenty-seven commentators, only four "generally
expressed support for self-governance exemptions to the tender offer rules." Summary of
Comments Relating to Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,112, at 88,573 (Mar. 1987).
Some legal scholars have advocated that individual companies be able to opt out of
application of the insider trading prohibition to transactions in their shares. See, e.g.,
Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trad-
ing, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. 9, 39-47 (1984) (advocating the "proper subject of contract" test);
Haddock & Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1449, 1462
n.28, 1468 (1986) (implicit or explicit contracts between a firm and its insiders should be
enforced).
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tem in which the only safeguard against self-dealing by management is
shareholder majority rule. Part III of this Article explains the inadequa-
cies of the theoretical, market-oriented basis for the movement towards
permitting corporations to opt out of fiduciary duty. Finally, Part IV
presents another argument in favor of retaining the duty of loyalty, the
mini-state view of corporations. This Article concludes that proposals of
the American Bar Association and others to negate the duty of loyalty
are contrary to well established notions of morality and fairness. The
assault on the citadel of fiduciary duty must cease.
I. THE ASSAULT ON FIDUCIARY DUTIES
A. The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance: Judge Easterbrook
and the Duty of Loyalty
On Friday, May 16, 1986, in the ballroom of the Mayflower Hotel in
Washington, D.C., the members of the American Law Institute14 spent
the day debating the provisions of Tentative Draft Number Five of the
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommen-
dations.'5 Tentative Draft Number Five contains provisions which cod-
ify the common law fiduciary duty of loyalty. 6 Late in the afternoon,
the reporter for Tentative Draft Number Five reached section 5.09, "Ef-
fect of a Standard of the Corporation."17 The reporters intended the sec-
tion to permit corporate boards of directors, by a "standard of the
corporation,""8 to delegate approval procedures for certain conflict of in-
terest situations.
Under section 5.09, a particular corporation's internal rules could per-
mit the board to delegate implementation of its conflict of interest deci-
sions to a board committee or a single executive likely to have no interest
in the matter. 19 A corporate decision-maker below the board of directors
14. The Author is an elected member of the American Law Institute and was present
at the May 16, 1986, Institute proceedings.
15. Commenced in the early 1980s, the American Law Institute Corporate Govern-
ance Project now consists of eight tentative drafts. See Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance: Analysis and Recommendations (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1988). See generally Perkins,
The ALI Corporate Governance Project in Midstream, 41 Bus. Law. 1195, 1196 (1986)
(brief history of the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project).
16. In his opening remarks that day, the reporter for Tentative Draft Number Five,
Mr. Marshall Small, had retitled these provisions "the duty of fair dealing." See Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 15 n.* (Tent. Draft No.
7, 1987) [hereinafter Corporate Governance VII].
17. See American Law Institute, Proceeding of the 63d Annual Meeting 407 (1986)
[hereinafter ALI Proceeding]. Tentative Draft Number Five contains fourteen sections.
See Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations §§ 5.01-5.14
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1986) [hereinafter Corporate Governance V]. The reporter for Part V
had jumped ahead from § 5.06 to § 5.09, see ALI Proceeding, supra, at 407-08, returning
to consideration of the omitted sections after the discussion of § 5.09, see id. at 434.
18. "'Standard of the corporation' means a valid certificate or by-law provision, or
board or shareholder resolution, regulating corporate governance." Corporate Govern-
ance V, supra note 17, § 1.30.
19. See id. § 5.09.
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level could, for example, review disclosure and accept or reject an of-
ficer's or director's proposal to "enter into a transaction with the corpo-
ration that is of a specified type that could be expected to recur in the
ordinary course of business."2 To husband the board's resources, intra-
corporate standards could vary from established conflict of interest
procedures.21
At that point in the proceeding Judge Frank Easterbrook of the
United States Court of Appeals stepped to a microphone. 22 Judge Eas-
terbrook believed that, under section 5.09, corporations could vary from
or indeed do away with application of all the principles enunciated in
sections 5.02 to 5.08.23 For example, with regard to a subject debated at
length by Institute members that afternoon, Judge Easterbrook thought
that, by adopting a standard of the corporation, disinterested directors
could ratify past conflict of interest transactions. This ratification would
be the equivalent of the advance approval the ALI corporate conflict of
interest procedures contemplated.
Continuing, Judge Easterbrook also suggested that, under section 5.09,
a corporation's shareholders could vote to amend its articles of incorpo-
ration to exempt that corporation's directors and officers from all or part
of the common law fiduciary duty of loyalty. For example, amendments
to the articles could carve out an area of the corporation's business as not
being a corporate opportunity for executives of that company, and thus
not subject to conflict of interest analysis and rules against usurpation or
diversion. Judge Easterbrook indicated that some procedural protections
might be in order, such as requiring approval of a majority of sharehold-
20. In its entirety the section then provided:
If a director or senior executive relies upon a standard of the corporation that
authorizes a director or senior executive to:
(a) enter into a transaction with the corporation that is of a specified type
that could be expected to recur in the ordinary course of business; or
(b) advance his pecuniary interests by using his corporate position or corpo-
rate property in a specified manner that is not unlawful and that could be ex-
pected to recur in the ordinary course of business;
and the standard was authorized by disinterested directors or disinterested
shareholders, following disclosure of the type of transaction or conduct in-
tended to be covered by the standard, the standard is to be deemed equivalent to
an authorization of the action by disinterested directors or shareholders under
§§ 5.02 (transactions with the corporation), 5.03 (compensation of directors and
senior executives), or 5.04 (use of corporate position or corporate property), as
the case may be.
Id. § 5.09 (cross-references omitted).
21. See id. § 5.09 comment, at 148.
22. See ALI Proceeding, supra note 17, at 411-13.
23. Sections 5.02 to 5.08 are titled as follows: 5.02 Transactions with the Corpora-
tion; 5.03 Compensation of Directors and Senior Executives; 5.04 Use of Corporate Posi-
tion, Non-Public Information Concerning the Corporation, or Corporate Property; 5.05
Corporate Opportunities; 5.06 Competition with the Corporation; 5.07 Transactions Be-
tween Corporations with Common Directors and Senior Executives; 5.08 Conduct on
Behalf of Associates of Directors or Senior Executives. See Corporate Governance V,
supra note 17, at xiv.
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ers at two successive annual meetings to adopt an opt out amendment to
articles of incorporation.2"
Following Judge Easterbrook's comments, several corporate counsel
took the floor. They had not envisioned what Judge Easterbrook sug-
gested section 5.09 could do, but they wholeheartedly supported his in-
terpretation.25 Upon motion made and passed, the house referred the
subjects of standards of the corporation and opting out of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty to the reporters for further study.26
B. Delaware Section 102(b)(7): The Parade to Opt Out of Duty of
Care Liability
The first authoritative provision enabling corporations to opt out of
fiduciary duty was a Delaware statute relating to the duty of care rather
than the duty of loyalty. On July 1, 1986, Delaware amended its general
corporation law to provide that an optional provision in articles of incor-
poration could limit or exclude corporate directors' liability for any
breach of the duty of care,
provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of
a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good
faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation
of law;.., or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived
an improper personal benefit.27
Delaware thus enacted an opt out statute, but one substantially different
from that Judge Easterbrook envisioned in proposed ALI section 5.09.
Most important, the Delaware opt out statute applies only to breaches of
the duty of care.28 Additionally, a corporation may elect to opt out only
24. See ALI Proceeding, supra note 17, at 414 ("The reason for two successive annual
meetings is because a change of this sort can be very serious and it would allow the
opportunity for a proxy fight at the second meeting." (comments of Judge Easterbrook)).
25. Some in the academy have made suggestions similar to Judge Easterbrook's. Cf
N. Wolfson, supra note 8, at 68 (empirical analysis of the corporate opportunity doctrine
should reveal "the obvious possibility" that legal costs outweigh the benefits of retaining
the duty of loyalty); Fischel & Bradley, supra note 5, at 290-92 (little difference between
corporate law duty of care and duty of loyalty and any reform proposal based on these
rules is "highly suspect").
26. See ALI Proceeding, supra note 17, at 427 (motion made); id. at 433 (motion
passed). Subsequently, the ALI drafters shaded § 5.09 a bit toward what Judge Easter-
brook desired, adding that under a standard of the corporation a corporate official may
also
(c) take advantage of a specified type of corporate opportunity of which the
director or senior executive becomes aware other than (i) in connection with
the performance of his functions as a director or senior executive.., or (iii)
through the use of corporate information or property; or
(d) engage in competition of a specified type; ....
Coprorate Governance VII, supra note 16, § 5.09.
27. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988).
28. See id.
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for directors and only for liability for money damages. 29
Since 1986, over thirty states"° have followed Delaware's lead, a few
permitting much broader exclusions from duty of care liability than did
Delaware.31 This trend began in the 1987 annual meeting season, when
American corporations in great number sought to implement the law's
new liberality by seeking shareholder approval for opt out provisions in
articles of incorporation.32
For the most part, other states have followed Delaware's lead, not
29. Corporate officers' liability may not be limited or excluded under the provision
and, as to directors or officers, injunctions against violation of the duty of care may still
be obtained. See Sparks, Delaware's D & 0 Liability Law: Other States Should Follow
Suit, Legal Times, Aug. 18, 1986, at 10, col. 1, 4.
30. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-054(A)(9) (Supp. 1988); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 4-27-
202(B)(3) (Supp. 1987); Cal. Corp. Code § 204 (a)(10) (West Supp. 1989); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 7-3-101(1)(u) (Supp. 1987); Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-171(b)(3) (Supp. 1988); Idaho
Code § 30-1-54(2) (Supp. 1988); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 491.5(8), 496A.49(13) (West Supp.
1988); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-6002(b)(8) (Supp. 1987); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12:24(C)(4)
(West Supp. 1989); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1-2) (West Supp. 1988);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.1209(c) (West Supp. 1988); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 302A.251(4) (West Supp. 1989); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-202(2)(a)(v) (1987); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 21-2035(2) (Supp. 1988); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.037(1) (1987); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 14A:2-7(3) (West Supp. 1988); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 53-12-2(E) (Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1989); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-7(11) (Supp. 1988);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 100603)(7) (West Supp. 1989); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8364
(Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-1.1-48(B)(6) (Supp. 1988); S.D. Codified Laws
§ 47-2-58.8 (Supp. 1988); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1302-7.06(B) (Vernon Supp.
1989); Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-49.1 (Supp. 1988); Wash. Rev. Code § 23A.12.020(10)(d)
(Supp. 1989); Wyo. Stat. § 17-1-202(c) (1987); see also infra note 31. See generally Ra-
din, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom, 39 Hastings
L.J. 707, 744-54 (1988) (complete compilation and discussion of duty of care statutes);
Note, The Limitation of Directors'Liability: A Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 66 Tex. L.
Rev. 411, 439-40 & nn.157-58 (1987) (partial statutory compilation); Comment, supra
note 7, at 242 nn.12-13 (same).
31. Indiana and Wisconsin, for example, simply abolished director liability for duty
of care violations. See Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 1987); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 180.307 (West Supp. 1988). These provisions are self-implementing: no amendment of
articles of incorporation need be undertaken, although individual corporations may rein-
sert a duty of care in articles of incorporation or bylaws. For other statutes that abolish
duty of care liability, see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.1645 (West Supp. 1988); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 1701.59(D) (Page Supp. 1987); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-690A, C (1985).
Some statutes differ from the Delaware amendment in that they do not contain explicit
exceptions for duty of loyalty violations. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2035(2) (Supp. 1988);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.037(1) (1987); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 402(b) (McKinney Supp.
1989); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-7(11) (Supp. 1988); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8364 (Purdon
Supp. 1988).
32. See Crossen, Companies Ask Holders to Limit Boards' Liability, Wall St. J., Oct.
7, 1986, at 35, col. 3; Many Delaware Corporations Moving to Limit Directors' Liability,
18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1784-85 (Dec. 12, 1986).
The limitation on directors' liability, which opt out statutes made possible, resulted
from the crisis in Director and Officers' (D & 0) liability insurance, which was part of the
general corporate liability insurance crisis in the mid-1980s. Adding fuel to the fire, in
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), the Delaware Supreme Court held
liable for $20 million distinguished directors who had negligently approved the chief ex-
ecutive officer's proposal to sell the company. The Van Gorkom decision precipitated
further escalation of the insurance crisis. These events are fully reviewed in Note, supra
1988]
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changing the standard of director conduct but merely permitting corpo-
rations to opt out of liability for violations by their officials.33 Since the
standard of conduct remains the same, plaintiff shareholders can still ob-
tain injunctive relief in corporations electing the opt out provision.34
Moreover, because severe forms of negligence rising to the level of con-
scious disregard are akin to intentional conduct, in all probability these
shareholders will continue to be able to obtain damage recoveries for the
corporate treasury whenever directors have been reckless.3 -
C. Distinctions Between the Duty of Care and the Duty of Loyalty
The common law has always drawn "a sharp distinction" between
allegations of director misconduct involving breach of trust or self-
dealing.., and allegations of simple breach of fiduciary duty/waste of
corporate assets .... The distinction between "mere" bribes and
bribes coupled with kickbacks to the directors makes a great deal of
sense, indeed, is fundamental to ... the preservation of state corporate
note 30, at 411; Comment, 1986 Ohio Corporation Amendments: Expanding the Scope of
Director Immunity, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 663 (1988); Comment, supra note 7, at 244-61.
In the early 1980s, several D & 0 insurers paid off large, publicized claims. See Hilder,
Risky Business: Liability Insurance is Difficult to Find Now For Directors, Officers, Wall
St. J., July 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (reporting, inter alia, one insurer's payment of $25 million
in shareholder suit against managers of Wickes, Inc.). Several companies, mainly large
banks experiencing loan losses, sued their former officers and, therefore in effect, their
own D & 0 insurance carriers for large amounts. See id. (Bank of America and Chase
Manhattan Bank); see also Lewin, Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7,
1986, at D-1, col. 3 (same). Takeover activity increased dramatically, with the risk that
disgruntled shareholders could sue directors who had defeated a takeover bid.
Insurers reacted in several ways. They made coverage unavailable to a number of com-
panies at any price. In coverage they did continue, they broadened exclusions. For ex-
ample, an insured against insured exclusion elevated the possibility of the corporation
itself claiming under the policy. See Lewin, supra, at D-4; Hertzberg, Insurers Beginning
to Defuse Coverage on Directors, Officers in Takeover Cases, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1986, at
3, col. 2. Last of all, insurers raised premiums dramatically, sometimes to ludicrous
heights. Faced with a hostile takeover, one corporation found its $70 million policy at a
$140,000 annual premium cancelled and $100 million replaced coverage available at a
$6.6 million premium. See Hilder, supra, at 1, col. 6 (Unocal Inc.).
33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Virginia is an exception. See supra
note 7 and accompanying text. Indiana and Wisconsin have adopted opt in rather that
opt out statutes. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
35. Under statutes such as Delaware's, directors remain liable for "intentional mis-
conduct." See supra note 27 and accompanying text. However, "[i]n certain areas of the
law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of impos-
ing liability for some act." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94, n.12
(1976) (holding that mere lack of reasonable care cannot ground damage recovery under
SEC Rule 10b-5). In the securities law area, the federal courts have held that conduct
which is "highly unreasonable" and an "extreme departure from the standards of ordi-
nary care" is equivalent to intentional conduct, allowing recovery of damages. See Sand-
ers v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Franke v.
Midwestern Dev. Auth., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,786, at 90,850 (W.D. Okla.
1976)). See generally M. Steinberg, Securities Regulation: Liabilities and Remedies
§ 7.02 (1985) (most courts find "highly reckless" conduct to be intentional for purposes
of SEC Rule lOb-5).
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law.3 6
Other examples of sharp differences in treatment of the two duties
abound. For one, the business judgment rule may shield from judicial
scrutiny business decisions or errors in judgment by directors. Yet the
rule never shields from scrutiny transactions or decisions about which
colorable claims of self-dealing have been made.37 As a second example,
the standards for ratification of directors' past acts vary depending upon
whether mere mismanagement or self-dealing has been alleged.38
Chicago School law and economics scholars, however, discern a differ-
ence in degree but not in quality between conduct the duty of care regu-
lates and conduct the duty of loyalty governs. In economic terms, the
distinction between fiduciary duties is thought to be strained:
[I]t is extremely misleading to talk about conflicts of interest as only
paying yourself an above market rate of compensation. There are
many other types of conflicts of interest .... We talk about a few of
them-consuming excess leisure, not concentrating hard. The various
permutations are infinite. A conflict of interest is always present. Du-
ties of care and of loyalty are simply different manifestations of the
inherent conflict of interest in an agency relationship. Building on
that, we do not see any basis for having a completely different set of
legal rules. .... 39
A majority of states' corporation laws permit a corporation, or a major-
ity of its shareholders, to dispense with the liability of corporate officals
36. Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 776-78 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1145 (1982). The court further argued that
[mI]any corporate actions taken by directors in the interest of the corporation
might offend and engender controversy among some stockholders. . . . The
tenor of a company's labor relations policies, economic decisions to relocate or
close established industrial plants .... decisions to develop (or not to develop)
particular natural resources or forms of energy technology... are just a few
examples of business judgments... which may nonetheless cause shareholder
dissent and provoke claims of "wasteful," "unethical," or even "immoral" busi-
ness dealings....
Absent credible allegations of self-dealing by the directors... we hold that
director misconduct of the type traditionally regulated by state corporate law
need not be disclosed in proxy solicitations for director elections.
Id. at 778-79 (footnotes omitted).
37. See Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations
§ 4.01(c)(1) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8
Hofstra L. Rev. 93, 115-18 (1979).
38. Compare Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 398 (1964) (ratifica-
tion of general directorial mismanagement permitted) with Aronoff v. Albanese, 85
A.D.2d 3, 6-7, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (2d Dep't 1982) (ratification of self-dealing not
permitted). See generally R. Clark, Corporate Law § 5.3.2, at 178-79 (1986).
39. Edited Transcript of Proceedings of the Business Roundtable/Emory University
Law and Economics Center Conference on Remedies Under the ALI Proposals: Law and
Economics, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 357, 368 (1986) (remarks of Daniel Fischel); see also Fis-
chel & Bradley, supra note 5, at 290-91 (distinction between duty of care and loyalty is
"not at all clear.").
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to the corporation for violations of the duty of care.4 Under the eco-
nomic analysis, then, the law also should permit opting out of applicabil-
ity of the duty of loyalty.
The common law has always differentiated between the two. The com-
mon law distinction between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty is
rooted in the degree to which a breach of either duty involves fault, a
concept economics does not recognize. Duty of care analysis is negli-
gence analysis, dealing with directors' nonfeasance or misfeasance.
Under the guise of the latter, duty of care claims become the vehicle by
which shareholders raise claims of ineptitude or lack of skill, as well as
lack of diligence,41 often in the context of conscious decision-making.
The generic term used for duty of care questions is not simply negligence,
but mismanagement.
In contrast, the duty of loyalty deals with purposeful conduct of a ve-
nal, opportunistic sort. In the common law hierarchy of fault, duty of
loyalty violations rank high, while duty of care claims rank low.4" Econ-
omists do not seriously discuss this traditional distinction between the
degrees of fault involved.43
Another distinction between the duties of care and loyalty lies in the
ability of directors to control developments. Financial problems of the
corporation can be caused by market forces not within the directors' con-
trol. Yet those losses can result in a duty of care claim of director liabil-
ity. Opportunistic behavior by corporate officials is a different matter.
Only directors and officers themselves cause duty of loyalty violations.
Directors are in the best position to control such behavior by fellow di-
rectors and officers. They certainly are in the best position to rein in
their own venal tendencies.
The economic view that there is no distinction between the duties of
care and loyalty is severely flawed because economists ignore the element
of fault that in law distinguishes mere negligence or misfeasance from
intentional self-dealing. Moreover, even some practitioners of economic
analysis of law do not embrace erasure of the distinction between the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.' Market forces do not adequately
40. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (directors approved
sale of public company in two hour meeting without even seeing documents or reports);
Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880) (directors held liable for constructing new bank building
while bank was in precarious financial position).
42. Ironically, with duty of care claims the fault may be small yet the damages may
be great, out of all proportion to the fault involved. Losses in a publicly held corporation
may run to hundreds of millions of dollars. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985) (discussed supra note 32). In duty of loyalty cases, the fault may be
regarded as severe but the damages for which the director is held accountable may be
relatively limited, say, return of perquisites found to be excessive. See Conard, A Behav-
ioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 Duke L.J. 895, 898.
43. See Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract,
85 Colum. L. Rev. 1403, 1432 n.76 (1985).
44. See, e.g., Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Marketfor Corpo-
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police opportunistic behavior. Market forces will not deter the "one
shot" large defalcation or embezzlement.45 On a lesser scale, informa-
tion costs or market failure may prevent share prices from fully reflecting
the extent of managers' opportunistic behavior."
D. The Erosion of Conflict of Interest Standards and the ABA's
Attempt to Eliminate the Duty of Loyalty
1. Background of Corporate Conflict of Interest Statutes
Statutes have governed the duty of loyalty since the 1930s.47 Prior to
that time, under the common law, interested director and other conflict
of interest transactions were voidable unless, based upon full disclosure, a
disinterested director approved the transaction and the transaction was
fair to the corporation.48 The duty of loyalty statutes have cut the three
pronged common law test in two, making it disjunctive rather than con-
junctive. A conflict of interest transaction may be approved upon either
disclosure and a disinterested director vote or fairness. 49
rate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 385, 390 ("courts have a role to
play in settling up with opportunistic managers"); Goetz, A Verdict on Corporate Liability
Rules and the Derivative Suit: Not Proven, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 344, 350 (1986) ("Contract
methodology suggests that [lawyer-economists] are too quick to condemn the distinction
between the duty of care and the duty of loyalty as one that is artificial.").
45. Cf Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
6 J. Legal Studies 251, 278-80 (1977) (advocating return to "fairness rule" because mar-
ket forces do not protect shareholders from "one shot" raids by management on corpo-
rate assets).
46. See, e.g., Allen, Posner Agrees to Formation of a Panel on Pay, Transactions
Within His Empire, Wall St. J., June 30, 1987, at 5, col. 1 (attempt to rein in extensive
course of self-dealing over many years by chief executive of several publicly held
companies).
47. A good general primer in the area is Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Responses to
Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 Notre
Dame Law. 201 (1977). In 1933, California passed the first statute regulating interested
director transactions. See id. at 204 & n.28.
48. See, e.g., Schnittger v. Old Home Consol. Mining Co., 144 Cal. 603, 78 P. 9
(1904) (finding no fraud where directors did not disclose that they had loaned money to
the corporation, but transaction made under authority of corporation which sustained no
detriment); Jacobson v. Brooklyn Lumber Co., 184 N.Y. 152, 76 N.E. 1075 (1906) (in-
crease in assets of corporation is no defense in a derivative action for depletion); cf. Got-
tlieb v. The Mead Corp., 72 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 137 N.E.2d 178 (C.P. 1954) (decision is
exclusively for board of directors in absence of bad faith, gross negligence or willful dis-
sipation of corporate assets), aff'd, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 283, 134 N.E.2d 857 (Ct. App. 1955).
See generally Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality,
22 Bus. Law. 35, 39-40 (1966) ("a contract between a director and his corporation was
valid if it was approved by a disinterested majority of his fellow directors and was not
found to be unfair or fraudulent").
49. See Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 47, at 202. Arguably, at that point the duty is no
longer one of loyalty but merely one to refrain from damaging the corporation. Fairness
to the corporation connotes as its opposite damage or a likelihood of damage to the cor-
poration. Thus, under modern statutory fairness tests, a corporate official's duty has be-
come mere avoidance of harm to the principal. This should be contrasted with the
aspirational duty of loyalty or of "undivided loyalty," which the common law exalted.
See State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d 375, 381, 391
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The effect of corporate compliance with those statutes varies. Fre-
quently, compliance with the statutory procedure shifts the burden of
proof.5 0 If the corporation complies with the proper procedure, then the
party attacking the interested director transaction has the burden of
proving the transaction unfair to the corporation.51 If the corporation
fails to follow the procedures outlined, then the party seeking to uphold
the transaction, usually the corporation and the interested director, has
the burden of proving the transaction fair. 2 This shifting of the burden
of proof, coupled with the division of the common law test into a disjunc-
tive one, substantially lessens a complaining shareholder's chance of suc-
cess in a claim of breach of the duty of loyalty. 3
Other statutes purport to be more authoritative. These statutes pro-
vide simply that an interested director transaction is not voidable if, upon
full disclosure, disinterested directors approved it, or the transaction was
fair." On their face, then, such statutes seem completely to immunize a
transaction that ostensibly disinterested directors approved, no matter
how outlandish or injurious to the corporation the transaction might be.
In Fliegler v. Lawrence,55 the Supreme Court of Delaware held such a
literal reading of these statutes itself to be outlandish. The court stated
"[section 144] merely removes an 'interested director' cloud when its
P.2d 979, 983 (1964) (fidelity of the agent and not mere prevention of injury to the corpo-
ration has traditionally been the law's goal). For example
[an] allegation of damages to the corporation.., has never been considered to
be an essential requirement for a cause of action founded on a breach of fiduci-
ary duty. This is because the function of such an action, unlike an ordinary tort
or contract case, is not merely to compensate the plaintiff for wrongs committed
•. . but... "to prevent [wrongs], by removing from agents and trustees all
inducement to attempt dealing for their own benefit in matters which they have
undertaken for others ...."
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 498, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81
(1969) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Dutton v. Willner, 52 N.Y. 312,
319 (1873)); accord Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217, 226-27 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (reviewing
Missouri cases).
50. See, e.g., Calif. Corp. Code § 310(a)(3) (West 1977) (if transaction not approved
by proper statutory procedure, then party asserting validity of the transaction has burden
of showing it was just and reasonable); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, % 8.60(b) (Smith-Hurd 1985)
("person asserting validity [of the transaction] has the burden of proving fairness unless"
statutory procedures for authorization, approval or ratification followed); Wash. Rev.
Code § 23A.08.435(2) (Supp. 1989) (same).
51. See Cohen v. Ayres, 596 F.2d 733, 740-41 (7th Cir. 1979); Fliegler v. Lawrence,
361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976); Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 199, 80
N.E.2d 522, 527 (1948).
52. See Corporate Governance V, supra note 17, § 5.02(b); see, e.g., Geddes v. Ana-
conda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921) (placing burden on corporation to
show fairness once plaintiff proved harm); Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768-70
(2d Cir. 1980) (same); Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 173 F.2d 416, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (same); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d
218, 221 (Del. 1976) (same).
53. See Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 47, at 225-26.
54. See Corporate Governance V, supra note 17, § 5.02; see, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit.
8, § 144 (1983); 2 Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.31 (3d ed. 1985).
55. 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
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terms are met and provides against invalidation of an agreement 'solely'
because such a director or officer is involved. Nothing in the statute
sanctions unfairness to [the corporation] or removes the transaction from
judicial scrutiny."56 Although the court ultimately found the transac-
tion's terms fair, Fliegler's message was clear: the duty of loyalty cannot
be circumvented merely by use of intracorporate conflict of interest
procedures.
2. The ABA's Attempt to Negate the Duty of Loyalty
The ABA amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act labori-
ously seek to eliminate even the small chance of fairness review provided
by Fliegler. If full disclosure has been made and disinterested directors5"
have approved the transaction, the statute precludes judicial review of
the transaction.58
Seeming to circumscribe its operation, however, the statute's narrow
definition of "conflicting interest transactions"59 excludes many transac-
tions that, by common sense, usually involve conflicts of interest.60 This
56. Id. at 222.
57. The Model Business Corporation Act terms disinterested directors as "qualified
directors." For purposes of the amended section of the statute "qualified directors" are
those directors not having any interest in or relation to the conflicting interest transac-
tion. See Model Business Corp. Act § 8.62(d), reprinted in, Committee on Corp. Laws,
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to Director's
Conflicting Interest Transactions, 43 Bus. Law. 691, 710 (1988).
58. According to the Model Business Corporation Act:
A director's conflicting interest transaction may not be enjoined, set aside, or
give rise to an award of damages.., in a proceeding by a shareholder or by or
in the right of the corporation, because the director, or any person with whom
or which he has a personal, economic, or other association, has an interest in
the transaction, if: (1) directors' action respecting the transaction was at any
time taken in compliance with section 8.62.
Id. § 8.61(b), at 703-04.
Section 8.62 provides that a conflicting interest transaction must be approved upon full
disclosure and an affirmative vote, either by a majority of (but not less than two) qualified
directors, or by a "duly empowered committee of the board." Id. § 8.62(a), at 709. This
section further provides that, if the director seeking to engage in a conflicting interest
transaction cannot disclose the conflict (for example because of duty of confidentiality),
then § 8.62(a) is satisfied if the director in question discloses to the board his conflict as
well as whatever limitations may exist and takes no part in the deliberations or vote. See
id. § 8.62(b), at 709.
59. The statute states that a "conflicting interest" arises if, at the time of a transaction
involving the corporation, the director knows that he, a person related to him, or an
entity in which he has a controlling, agency, partnership or similar interest, has a finan-
cial interest in the transaction such that "the interest would reasonably be expected to
exert an influence on the director's judgment if he were called upon to vote on the trans-
action." Id. § 8.60(1), at 696-97.
60. For example, the comment to § 8.61(a) states:
If a plaintiff charges that a director had a conflict of interest with respect to a
transaction of the corporation because the other party was his brother-in-law,
the answer of the court should be: "No. A brother-in-law, as such and without
more, is not included in section 8.60(3) as a related person-and under section
8.61(a), I have no authority to reach out farther." If a plaintiff contends that
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sleight of hand is misleading because the statute further provides that, if
a common sense conflict of interest transaction is not a statutory "con-
flicting interest transaction," then the transaction is not reviewable at all,
regardless of whether disinterested directors approved the transaction.61
In attempting to eliminate this relatively small chance of a fairness
review, 62 the business lawyers who served on the committee have bar-
tered continued erosion of the common law duty of loyalty in exchange
for a small amount of additional transaction certitude in business deal-
ings. In attempting to construct a set of "bright line" rules, 63 the com-
mittee has substituted for lofty general principle a stationary target that
sharp, amoral, or unscrupulous corporate officials can see and narrowly
avoid. Thus the committee and the Model Business Corporation Act
amendments rob the duty of loyalty of any of the remaining aspirational
quality with which it has traditionally been infused.6
3. The ABA's Unconvincing Reasoning: The Lowest Rather Than
the Highest Common Denominator in Business Morality
The Model Business Corporation Act drafters' reason for eliminating
judicial review is completely unconvincing: "It is important to keep
firmly in mind that it is a contingent risk we are dealing with-that an
interest conflict is not in itself a tort or a crime or injurious to others. 65
Generations have thought otherwise. When charged with responsibility
for the affairs or property of others, unfaithfulness is one of the most
serious moral failures of all. As Mr. Justice Stone warned:
[W]hen the history of the financial era which has just drawn to a close
comes to be written, most of its mistakes and its major faults will be
ascribed to the failure to observe the fiduciary principle, the precept as
old as holy writ, that "a man cannot serve two masters". . .. No
thinking man can believe that an economy built upon a business foun-
dation can permanently endure without some loyalty to that princi-
the director had a conflict of interest in a corporate transaction because the
other party is president of the golf club the director wants desperately to join,
the court should respond: "No. The only director's conflicting interest on the
basis of which I can set aside a corporate transaction... is a financial interest as
defined in section 8.60."
Id. § 8.61(a) comment, at 705.
61. See id. § 8.61(a), at 703.
62. The paucity of reported appellate decisions evidences this. The cases in which
courts have proceeded to a fairness review, despite intracorporate procedures having been
followed, are very few in number. Besides Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del.
1976) (discussed supra text accompanying note 55), most frequently mentioned case is
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66
(1952).
63. See Committee on Corp. Laws, supra note 57, at 693 (American Bar Association's
justification for amending Model Business Corporation Act is to create a set of "bright
line" rules).
64. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (traditional common law view of duty
of loyalty).
65. Committee on Corp. Laws, supra note 57, at 693 (emphasis in original).
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ple. . . . [T]hose who serve nominally as trustees, but relieved, by
clever legal devices, from the obligation to protect those whose inter-
ests they purport to represent, corporate officers and directors who
award to themselves huge bonuses from corporate funds .... suggest
how far we have ignored the necessary implications of that principle.
The loss and suffering inflicted on individuals, the harm done to a so-
cial order founded upon business and dependent upon its integrity, are
incalculable. 6
6
The Model Business Corporation Act drafters neglect to disclose just
how remote is the chance of the fairness review they fear. In the last
decade, derivative suits based solely upon alleged breaches of fiduciary
duty have had only a minuscule chance of seeing the full light of plenary
judicial proceedings.67
Even if a corporation has failed to follow proper conflict of interest
procedures, with the advent of the special litigation committee in the late
1970s, most corporations will be able to stave off a fairness review-even
after a complaining shareholder has filed suit-by appointing a special
litigation committee composed of a few new disinterested directors. If
the committee recommends that the court dismiss the filed action as not
in the corporation's best interests, and if the committee has been suffi-
ciently diligent in the investigation leading to a dismissal recommenda-
tion, then under the business judgment rule, the court will dismiss the
pending action without examining its merits.68
The reduced risk of judicial review heightens, not lessens, the need for
fairness review of interested director transactions in some cases. The re-
duced risk of judicial review also tips the balance toward retaining some
aspirational content and away from the purported need for more cer-
tainty in the corporate duty of loyalty area.69
The new American Bar Association initiative to limit the duty of loy-
alty's operation carries too far the developments that began with the ad-
vent of special litigation committees. Those developments continued
with statutory facilitation of duty of care opting out amendments in arti-
66. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1934) (remarks of
Mr. Justice Stone at the dedication of the University of Michigan School of Law
Quadrangle).
67. See Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 548, 324 S.E.2d 878, 886 (1985), modi-
fied, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987). See generally Branson, The American Law
Institute Principles of Corporate Governance and the Derivative Action: A View From the
Other Side, 43 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 399, 401-08 (1986) (analyzing obstacles and concerns
of plaintiffs' attorneys in derivative actions); Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate
Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 96, 145-46
(1980) (criticizing judicial opinions that expand directors' power to terminate shareholder
derivative suits).
68. Essentially, modem day use of the device dates from two cases, decided within
weeks of one another. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). An earlier case is Gall v. Exxon
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
69. See supra note 63 (stated purpose of amendments to Model Business Corporation
Act); supra note 49 (traditional common law statement of duty of loyalty).
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eles of incorporation. The recent American Bar Association amend-
ments fail to recognize the traditional common law distinction necessary
for statutory treatment of the duty of loyalty rather than the duty of care.
With the myopic vision born perhaps of lawyers too focused on particu-
lar clients and particular goals, the American Bar Association drafters
also fail to recognize the ultimate counter-productivity of the interested
director statute they propose for adoption by the states.
II. LIFE IN A CORPORATE WORLD DEVOID
OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
A. Constitutional Model of the Relationship Between Corporations
and Corporate Law
Some have viewed corporation law and the corporate charter as analo-
gous to constitutions, but for private rather than public enterprises.7"
Just as constitutions direct the structure of political bodies, corporate
laws and charters organize and delegate governance to what the English
term the "organs" of the company. 7 As governments do, corporations
have chief executive officers. To a degree, boards of directors resemble
legislatures for particular institutions. Laws and charters delegate and
assign various functions to these organs. More importantly perhaps,
constitutions place limits on what government, which in reality is the
representative of a plurality or a majority in a society, can and cannot do.
A constitution forbids a majority, or even a supermajority, from exceed-
ing certain limits.72 Even in a democracy, majority rules but it does not
rule absolutely.
Constitutional theory supports these views. Were the majority in a
political jurisdiction to adopt ordinances providing for invidious discrim-
ination in their society they might run afoul of constitutional provisions
forbidding such activity. If they could muster the necessary votes,73
however, the majority or supermajority could amend the constitution to
remove the textual obstacles in their way. But the majority's effort to
amend the constitution would not matter under the view that there exists
70. See M. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis 1 (1976).
In the same manner a constitution can be viewed as a corporate charter in a more global
sense.
71. See L.C.B. Gower, Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law 17-21 (4th ed.
1979).
72. See, eg., R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 373-79 (1986); see also id. at 376 ("constitu-
tional rights are designed exactly to prevent majorities from following their own convic-
tions about what justice requires"); id. at 256-57 ("A particular judge may think... that
political decisions should mainly respect majority opinion, and yet believe that this re-
quirement relaxes and even disappears when serious constitutional rights are in
question.").
73. A constitutional amendment may be proposed by a two-thirds vote of both houses
of Congress or by application of two-thirds of the states meeting in convention. In either
case, the further requirement is ratification by three-fourths of all the states, by legislature
or by convention, as specified by the proposed amendment. See U.S. Const. art. V.
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an irreducible minimum, a core which even a supermajority cannot take
away. Lord Coke spoke of "common right and reason" and denounced
laws which are "repugnant"-not repugnant "to" any articulated pre-
cept, but simply "repugnant."'74 Often such analysis comes close to an
outmoded natural law treatment of the subject,7" discredited in a positiv-
ist world which for constitutional analysis requires specific textual refer-
ences. Nonetheless, credible arguments exist that even a supermajority
cannot alter certain fundamental or core principles.
In corporate law, the notion that an irreducible core of shareholders'
rights exists finds frequent expression. In many cases, contrary to econo-
mists' nexus or web of contracts approach,76 courts find that contract
cannot override fiduciary duty. Alternatively, courts find that any con-
tract incorporates fiduciary duty as an implied term. Thus, a court has
held that a contract to maintain incorporators in office as directors does
not override the "inherent right to remove a director for cause, for im-
plicit in any agreement to maintain a particular director in office is that
director's duty to fulfill faithfully the requirements of his office." 77 In
interested director transactions, courts have held that not even disinter-
ested director approval "[s]anctions unfairness to [the corporation] or
removes the transaction from judicial scrutiny."78 In the area of corpo-
rate combinations, "no shop," "best efforts," "cancellation fee" and
other contractual provisions designed to favor one takeover partner over
another cannot override the duty of target company directors to serve the
best interests of shareholders and of the corporation.79
In corporation law, fiduciary duty, or some part of it, is this irreducible
minimum or core that even a supermajority cannot take away.80 Opting
74. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C.P. 1610), discussed in R. Berger,
Congress v. The Supreme Court 349 (1969).
75. See, e.g., J. Wilson, Comparison of the Constitution of the United States, with that
of Great Britain in 1 The Works of James Wilson 309, 329 (MeCloskey ed. 1967) (judges
are bound to obey "natural or revealed law, proceeding from divine authority" and to
pronounce acts contrary thereto void).
76. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
77. Springut v. Don & Bob Restaurants of Am., 57 A.D.2d 302, 305, 394 N.Y.S.2d
971, 973 (4th Dep't 1977).
78. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976); accord Remillard Brick Co.
v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 419-20, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952). This
feature of the corporate landscape is one that the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws
wishes to change. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
79. See, eg., Great W. Producers Co-op. v. Great W. United Corp., 200 Colo. 180,
187, 613 P.2d 873, 879 (1980) (board that had pledged best efforts did not have to recom-
mend offer to shareholders when intervening events had occurred); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) (injunction against
lockup option, no shop contract clause and cancellation fee agreement to favored suitor
upheld); ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 222 Neb. 136, 154, 382 N.W.2d 576, 586 (1986)
(fiduciary duty overrides best efforts clause in favor of first offeror).
80. It may be that fiduciary duty is a core, but a reducible one. In turn, inside that
core the irreducible minimum is the appraisal remedy, which on the occurrence of certain
triggering events such as statutory merger gives the minority shareholder the right to
have a court appraise her shares and to receive that amount in cash. See, eg., 3 Model
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out arrangements, or proposed interested director immunity statutes,
however, facilitate reduction of this core beyond what right and reason
should permit. Applying a wardhealer's analogy, opting out of fiduciary
duty will result in a spoils system, or some version of it. Extreme moral
hazard, self-enrichment, tolerance of extreme ineptitude, or nepotism
will result."1
B. Fiduciary Duty Viewed as a Limit on Majority Rule
In corporate law, majority-meaning majority of the shares-usually
rules.82 Yet some traditional discrete corporate law commands, espe-
Business Corp. Act Ann. § 13.02, at 1371-73 (Supp. 1988) (greatly increased number of
triggering events under Model Act).
81. Older corporation law cases held some statutory rights so fundamental that
neither subsequent shareholder action nor subsequent statutory amendment could affect
preexisting corporations, even despite the state's reservation of the power later to amend
the statute. See, e.g., State ex rel. Swanson v. Perham, 191 P.2d 689, 694 (Wash. 1948)
(straight voting for directors found to be "valuable vested property right" not affected by
later statute's introduction of cumulative voting), overruled, Seattle Trust & Say. Bank v.
McCarthy, 94 Wash. 2d 605, 611, 617 P.2d 1023, 1027 (1980).
Recent cases have abandoned that point of view. Not only do subsequent statutory
provisions bind existing corporations, but also the will of a shareholder majority, or two-
thirds, as the case may be, can take away certain features or shareholder rights long
regarded as fundamental. See, e.g., Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. McGowin, 271 Ala.
414, 426-27, 124 So. 2d 812, 823-24 (1960) (preemptive right held not to be a vested
right); Hanks v. Borelli, 2 Ariz. App. 589, 592, 411 P.2d 27, 30 (1966) (renewal of corpo-
rate charter from territorial days subjected corporation to cumulative voting requirement
not in existence at the time of incorporation); Seattle Trust & Say. Bank, 94 Wash. 2d at
611, 617 P.2d at 1027 (preemptive right not a vested right). Statutory rights, no matter
how fundamental, are no longer considered vested rights that cannot be taken away,
whether the right involved is the preemptive right to shares or the right to cumulate votes
in the election of directors. Hence, as a matter of statutory corporation law no irreduci-
ble core or minimum can be said to exist.
The very reason that vested rights have seen their demise, however, is because the
emphasis has shifted from whether certain rights had been vested to whether manage-
ment or majority shareholders had gone too far in eliminating rights, thereby breaching
their fiduciary duties to the minority. This shift from a hard and fast limitation on major-
ity rule to a more flexible fairness analysis took place in a number of areas, including
elimination of preemptive rights, cumulative voting and arrearages on preferred stock
dividends. See, e.g., Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 105 R.I. 36, 44, 249 A.2d 89, 94
(1969) (dividend arrearage). Thus a shift in the mode of analysis has occurred, not an
abandonment of the core of fundamental rights. Fiduciary duty, rather than some statu-
tory rights regarded as vested, became the new core or minimum that even a majority
could not take away. An early piece articulating this shift is Latty, Fairness-The Focal
Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1942); see also Hal-
loran, Equitable Limitations on the Power to Amend Articles of Incorporation, 4 Pac. L.J.
47 (1973).
82. This has been juxtaposed to rule by a majority of shareholders rather than shares.
See generally Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on
the Rule of "One Share, One Vote,", 56 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1970). Moreover, approxi-
mately a dozen and a half jurisdictions require a two-thirds rather than majority approval
of organic changes such as a merger, sale of assets, dissolution or amendment of articles
of incorporation, although the trend is toward majority vote on all matters. See supra
note 10.
[Vol. 57
CORPORATE FIDUCIARY STANDARDS
cially fiduciary duties, serve as limits upon unbridled majority rule.83
Even a majority of shares cannot authorize incumbent corporate manag-
ers to.enrich themselves at the corporation's expense through excessive
salary payments and other perquisites. A majority should not be able to
license the managers to buy and sell property to the corporation with no
possibility of an external review or other check or balance.
These statements find clearest expression in cases involving sharehold-
ers' attempted ratification of interested director transactions or other al-
leged duty of loyalty violations.84 In Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical
Corp. ,85 the Supreme Court of Delaware found that the majority did not
rule absolutely: "An unconscionable deal between directors personally
and the corporation they represent could not become conscionable
merely because most of the stockholders were either indifferent or actu-
ally in sympathy with the directors' scheme."'86
A further set of cases limits the majority in their ability to ratify inter-
ested director transactions or compensation schemes that amount to
waste of corporate assets. Waste of corporate assets, these cases hold,
cannot be ratified except by unanimous shareholder consent.87 Even a
majority's action before the fact, rather than after the fact as with ratifi-
cation, runs up against limits. When a majority of the shares has
adopted provisions in the articles of incorporation intended to authorize
directors to engage in conflict of interest transactions, courts have been
willing to give those provisions only limited weight.88 As one court
83. Common examples might include statutory provisions that forbid the loan of cor-
porate funds to officers and directors altogether or at least without specific shareholder
approval. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 10.05.213 (1985) (flat prohibition); Cal. Corp. Code
§ 315(g) (West Supp. 1989) (approval of disinterested shareholders required); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 21-2045 (1987) (flat prohibition); cf. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 143 (1983) (approval
of directors sufficient if they believe "such loan... may reasonably be expected to benefit
the corporation"). Another example is the preemptive right. Corporate officers and di-
rectors cannot issue shares for cash to themselves or their associates without first offering
minority shareholders the opportunity to maintain their proportionate ownership and
control interests. See, ag., 1 Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 6.30, at 458 (3d ed. 1985)
(25 jurisdictions grant the preemptive right subject to limitation or denial in articles of
incorporation); cf Revised Model Business Corp. Act. § 6.30(a)-(b) (1984) (preemptive
right does not exist unless provided for and, in the latter instance, still does not apply to
shares issued to corporate officers and directors).
84. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 518 (Del. Ch. 1978) (most ratification
must be unanimous); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 18, 99 N.E. 138, 142
(1912) (same); cf. Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 72, 128 N.E.2d 429, 436 (1955)
(majority approval would suffice).
85. 90 A.2d 660 (Del. 1952).
86. Id. at 665.
87. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 223 (Del. 1979) (even majority cannot
ratify indiscriminate award of stock options to managers); Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d
512, 521 (Del. Ch. 1978) ("waste of corporate assets is incapable of [stockholder] ratifica-
tion without unanimous stockholder consent"); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 479, 184
A.2d 602, 605 (1962) (allegation that advisory fees paid by investment company and
ratified by shareholders not upheld).
88. See, eg., Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 417, 8 N.E.2d 895,
907 (1937) (such a provision gives "no immunity to ... directors .... But it exonerates
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stated concerning limits on the majority's ability to discard or weaken
the duty of loyalty, "[e]xculpatory provisions of corporate articles create
no license to steal." 89
Only short pause is needed to demonstrate why restrictions on major-
ity rule are necessary as a practical matter. Questions of morality aside,
restrictions are essential to attract investors to entrust money to the com-
mon enterprise a corporation often represents. 90 Without a limit on the
majority's ability to self deal, that is, to expropriate to itself the minor-
ity's contribution to the venture, no sensible individual would invest in
any incorporated venture. At least, no individual would invest in a cor-
poration without first negotiating contractual protections that approxi-
mate what the duty of loyalty provides. In most instances, transaction
costs prevent such negotiations from taking place.9" Without minority
investors, far fewer common enterprises could or would be launched.
Absent the constraints of fiduciary duty, majority rule represents a
spoils system in which the party that obtains working or numerical vot-
ing control has unbridled opportunities for its own self-aggrandizement.
The other parties to the enterprise have no protection against the inepti-
tude or self-dealing of the manager, save possibly through the ballot box.
If the managers or those they represent do have numerical control, the
ballot will be of no avail. Majority not only rules, it rules absolutely.
III. THE CONTRACTARIAN MODEL: THE THEORETICAL
UNDERPINNINGS OF THE OPT OUT MOVEMENT
A. The Contractarian's Reply to the Majoritarian Model
1. The Contractarian's Model
The contractarian model has provided the justification for the modem
trend toward liberalizing corporate statutes and enabling incorporating
parties to define for themselves their organizational structure. Under
this view, corporate law's only function should be to facilitate citizens'
organization of their business affairs at the lowest possible cost.92 Hence,
them from adverse inferences which might otherwise be drawn against them."); Everett
v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 237, 43 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1942) (such a provision "has the effect
of exonerating the directors, at least in part," but not totally; court reviews transactions
on the merits despite charter provision).
89. Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972) (majority
shareholder president ordered to return to the corporation a salary he voted himself),
modified on other grounds, 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1973).
90. See Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure,
25 UCLA L. Rev. 738, 776 (1978).
91. In most cases the principal transaction costs are attorneys' fees.
92. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 90, at 781-82 ("corporation codes can [provide
efficiency and fairness] by providing standardized rules to govern shareholder-manage-
ment relations"); Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 913, 944 (1982) ("Apart
from minimizing transaction costs and possibly facilitating the operation of market forces
that discipline management, corporation law has little role to play.").
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a corporate statute might provide specific and general guidelines for or-
ganizational structure, as well as rules and principles that would con-
strain managers of the business in the conduct of its affairs. Ideally,
however, any enterprise should be free to adapt such rules to its particu-
lar situation through contractual arrangement. 93
To the contractarian, corporation codes and fiduciary duties serve only
to approximate the terms of incorporation that organizers ordinarily
would agree upon, absent transaction CoStS. 94 In most cases, transaction
costs will prevent the parties from negotiating their own arrangement.
Thus, many organizers of enterprises will not be able to utilize the lati-
tude contractarian statutes bestow upon them. Instead, perhaps with a
variation or two, parties to an entrepreneurial or other effort will plug
into the corporation code's model, which approximates the bargain they
would have reached by contract anyway.
The contractarian reply to the model of majority rule is that the major-
ity does not rule absolutely because corporations do not function in a
vacuum. As business enterprises, corporations function in market mi-
lieus in which market forces constrain and discipline corporate directors
and managers far more quickly and efficiently than fiduciary duties and
lawsuits based upon alleged violations of them ever could. 95
2. The Free Market as Superior Regulator
The detritus of corporate regulation that has accumulated over the
years purports to regulate in the interests of creditors and shareholders.
Contractarians, however, doubt the efficacy of regulation to correct per-
ceived abuses. They argue that, if any abuse is prevented, its prevention
generates great cost.96 Regulatory rules not only carry direct compliance
costs, for example attorneys' fees, but they also stifle innovation and risk
taking incentives that will most efficiently produce the goods and services
that society desires.
Contractarians believe, of course, that market forces monitor manage-
ment and prevent abuses more effectively than can legislators or judges.
First, they argue that a competitive product market rewards efficient cor-
porate management with greater sales and profits, while high cost man-
agement would lose profits long before corporate law fiduciary duties
could operate.97
Second, the market for corporate control, first described in 1965 by
93. See, e.g., R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 369-72 (3d ed. 1986).
94. See Fischel, supra note 92, at 944.
95. The contractarian approach views the incorporated firm as nothing more than a
"nexus" or "web" "of contracts" among providers of capital, managers, lenders, labor,
suppliers and consumers. See Brudney, supra note 43, at 1411-20; Fischel, supra note 92,
at 917-19.
96. See Anderson, supra note 90, at 788-89.
97. See F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 38-41
(2d ed. 1980).
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Dean Henry Manne,9' operates as a check on inefficient or self-dealing
managers. Assuming the marketplace will discount share prices to re-
flect inefficiency or self-dealing, wealthy investors who snatch up shares
at the reduced price will demand reforms within the company, make a
tender offer for shares, or otherwise proceed to vote out the inefficient
managers and replace them with more productive ones.99
A third market force superior to judicially or legislatively imposed re-
straints is management's reputational stake. To enhance career mobility,
managers must cultivate reputations for efficiency. Inefficiency inherent
in shirking and opportunism at the expense of the corporation imposes
agency costs on managers' firms. In turn, this impugns the reputation of
those firms' managers. According to contractarian philosophy, agency
cost theory and the market for managers are significant regulators of be-
havior within the corporate world.1°°
The abrogation of confining legal rules, the contractarian argues, will
give freer play to market forces which are better regulators of conduct. 101
Uninhibited by legal rules unilaterally imposed, managers will engage in
the optimum amount of risk taking, producing better returns for share-
holders and greater output for society as a whole. Therefore, the con-
tractarian concludes, a particular firm's shareholders, or a majority of
them, should be able to amend articles of incorporation to restrict or
eliminate application of the duty of loyalty to that firm's officers and
directors. Markets and the forces within them will prevent anything re-
sembling a spoils system from developing.
98. See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110,
113 (1965).
99. Regulation of tender offers requires that share prices decline by a further amount
equal to the costs of regulation before the market for corporate control can operate. For
that reason, some scholars have advocated complete repeal of federal and other regula-
tions. See, e.g., Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Con-
trol, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 24-26 (1978). But see
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981) (regulation should exist to prohibit target
company managers from utilization of any takeover defenses). The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has facilitated further impediments to the market for corporate control's operation
by recently upholding a second generation of state tender offer statutes. See CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1673 (1987). But see Romano, State Takeover Laws:
Constitutional but Dumb, Wall St. J., May 14, 1987, at 26, col. 4-6.
100. The seminal piece is Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); see also Fama,
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 (1980). A recent
summary of this neoclassical and other economists' models is contained in Coffee, Share-
holders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 25-35
(1986).
101. See N. Wolfson, supra note 8, at 64-65, 72. Near complete freedom to opt out, the
contractarian model which supports it and much of economic analysis's contribution to
the corporate area seem almost calculated to legitimate corporate management's de-
mands for freedom from all regulatory constraint. For that reason, many centrists who
find value in economic analysis suspect the contractarian model and its extreme implica-
tions. Others openly criticize it for its "apologist" content and origins. See, e.g., Brud-
ney, supra note 43, at 1415-20.
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3. Efficient Stock Markets and the Majoritarian Model
The spoils system analogy may be extreme, but in any case, the con-
tractarian would reply, if a spoils system does come into being, stock
markets are efficient. Efficient stock markets reflect developments in
companies and markets almost instantaneously, so much so that inves-
tors can succeed as well in the stock markets by choosing a portfolio of
stocks at random as by laborious research into companies and
industries. 10 2
Thus, the contractarian model accepts the potential for absolute ma-
jority rule because share prices will reflect the development of a spoils
system in a company. Those who invest unaware of a corporation's mis-
management are not harmed because they have purchased at a price that
already reflects the mismanagement's effects. Moreover, risk-taking in-
vestors may purchase shares of companies in which opting out has be-
come a means for mismanagement or opportunism and whose shares the
market has discounted. Finally, where mismanagement occurs, the
shareholder can minimize his losses by selling at the market price. Exit-
ing by way of the market rather than bringing lawsuits based on breaches
of fiduciary duties is the shareholder's most cost-effective and fastest
recourse. 103
The contractarians' final argument is that investors' portfolios should
be diversified to minimize the effect of any losses on particular inves-
tors."° Diversification, not lawsuits based on fiduciary duties, protects
the shareholder or investor from any mismanagement that opting out of
fiduciary duty in an individual corporation may facilitate.
In sum, the contractarian model relies on the assumption that market
forces, such as the market for corporate control and the market for man-
agers, minimize mismanagement better than fiduciary duties do, and fa-
cilitate the informed risk-taking and competition a global economy
requires. If mismanagement does occur, other market phenomena pro-
tect investors or minimize harm to them, again in a way which, the con-
tractarian believes, fiduciary duties never could.
102. See generally J. Lorie, P. Dodd & M. Kimpton, The Stock Market: Theories And
Evidence (2d ed. 1985); B. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street (4th ed. 1985).
103. For example, one commentator has noted that "[i]f they become dissatisfied with
the performance of management the best thing [for shareholders] to do is sell. During the
past 20 years, there have always been many profitable corporations into which they could
switch their bets at the cost of two commissions." Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory:
Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 248, 253
(1969).
104. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale L.J.
698, 713 (1982) ("the existence of diversification-not its employment-supports our ar-
gument"); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259, 1268 &
n.27 (1982) ("the option of diversification, an option available to every investor, greatly
minimizes investors' concern with financial collapse").
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B. A Reply to the Contractarian View
While the contractarian view may make good economic theory, the
view does not reflect actual conditions in the stock or corporate control
markets. The efficiency of stock markets is, at best, attenuated. Stock
market price adjustments radical enough to invoke the market for corpo-
rate control are infrequent and may in fact be inadequate to correct mis-
management without resort to legal channels.105 Finally, many
shareholders may be unable or unwilling to liquidate devalued stock or to
diversify their portfolios. The contractarians have ignored these facts
and, in so doing, have threatened the safeguard that fiduciary duties pro-
vide to shareholders.
For example, stock markets may be efficient as to widely traded, New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed stocks, but perhaps even then not to
the degree legal economic theorists have presumed. 106 As to less-active
segments of the NYSE list, the American and regional stock exchanges
and the over-the-counter markets, market efficiency attenuates. 107 Share
prices may not reflect the reality of what is occurring within companies
or industries, or may not do so with any rapidity.
As to whole categories of companies no share market or a very limited
one exists. For these somewhat closely held and quasi-public compa-
nies,108 it is doubtful that share prices accurately reflect reality. Yet in all
forms in which it has been enacted or proposed, erasure of fiduciary duty
is not limited to efficient markets or even to companies whose shares are
publicly held. 0 9 Opting out and statutory negation of fiduciary duty is
as much a possibility in small and quasi-public corporations as it is in
Fortune 500 companies. 110
Even when efficient share markets exist, the market for corporate con-
trol-the contractarians' second theory for permitting directors to opt
out of fiduciary duties-operates only in a roughhewn manner. Thus,
105. See Brudney, supra note 43, at 1431; Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corpora-
tions: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 839-40
(1981).
106. See, e.g., Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Se-
curities Research, 60 N.Y.U., L. Rev. 761, 770-96 (1985); Wang, Some Arguments that the
Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 341, 376-77 (1986).
107. See Wang, supra note 106, at 357 & nn.38-39.
108. This category could be defined as those companies with from I to 1000 sharehold-
ers. See, eg., Conard, The Corporate Census: A Preliminary Exploration, 63 Calif. L.
Rev. 440, 456-60 (1975). A 1970 estimate of the number of such corporations was nearly
1,730,000, or 99.8 percent of all incorporated entities in the United States. See id. at 458
table 6.
109. None of the opting out statutes thus far adopted has limited itself to publicly-held
or similar companies. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
110. Of course, in the very small company the opportunity better exists for adoption of
an opt out provision to be characterized as truly the volitional act of the owners. In the
case of a charter amendment, knowingly adopted by a unanimous shareholder group,
opting out may be said to be a voluntary act that harms no one. The difficulty again is
that none of the existent opt out statutes or proposals limit the device's use.
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share prices must not only reflect self-dealing, but they must also de-
crease considerably before the market for corporate control operates."'
Much damage can be done to investors' perceptions and the process of
capital formation before the market for corporate control rides to the
rescue. Fiduciary duty, suits based upon it and the deterrent they pose
can operate in a more precise, surgical fashion.
Similarly, it is unrealistic to view market liquidity as the shareholders'
best protection against breach of fiduciary duty losses. In many compa-
nies no market for sale may exist. If there is a market, it may be an
illiquid one. Hence, the shareholder who suspects mismanagement can-
not sell or can do so only at great cost.
Last of the contractarians' suggested protections for shareholders
against possibly deleterious effects from loss of fiduciary constraints is
portfolio diversification. Recent empirical research has shown, however,
that even among middle and upper level managers of publicly held com-
panies, stock portfolios are far less diversified than ordinary prudence
dictates.' 12 Aside from managers and employees, other categories of firm
specific1 13 investors exist. These non-diversified investors may be resi-
dents of the community in which the corporation operates or simply long
term investors in so-called opportunity companies.114 Although on the
surface non-diversification may be unwise, upon closer examination iden-
tification with particular companies may serve other values society
wishes to promote. Employee loyalty to the enterprise, a greater em-
ployee stake in the enterprise's efficiency, and a stable, longer term share-
holder base are values which from time to time are given more than lip
service.' 15 At a minimum, market or other forces produce firm specific
shareholders in significant numbers and the phenomenon cannot be gain-
said.' 16 Without the protection of portfolio diversification, those inves-
tors should have the protections fiduciary duty provides.
Firm specific shareholders should not be subjected to the absolute ma-
jority rule an opt out world might produce. With a non-diversified in-
111. See, eg., Brudney, supra note 43, at 1421-23 (explaining theoretical and opera-
tional limitations of market for managers); Scott, supra note 5, at 939 ("[W]hile managers
are always monitored by the market for corporate control.., that monitoring still leaves
them with a rather generous outer bound on the extraction of added personal gain. Proxy
contests and takeover bids are risky and expensive. .. ").
112. See, eg., Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L.
& Econ. 375, 388 (1983); Demsetz & Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership:
Causes and Consequences, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1155 (1985).
113. See generally Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial En-
trenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1257, 1285-88
(1985).
114. "'Opportunity companies' are those companies whose present assets and earnings
may be insubstantial but whose longer term growth prospects are perceived to be the
reverse, such as so-called high technology companies." Branson, supra note 67, at 426
n. 151.
115. See Coffee, supra note 100, at 67-73; see also infra note 119 (recitals of so-called
second generation takeover statutes).
116. See Demsetz, supra note 112, at 388-89.
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vestment portfolio, employment with the same company in which they
have invested significant amounts of funds, and residence in the same
community in which that corporation operates or is a dominant force,
some shareholders' lives are more inextricably bound up with the fate of
a company than they are with any political or governmental entity. In
the latter realm, of course, the majority has long been prevented from
ruling absolutely by restraints more limiting than mere common law fi-
duciary duties.
IV. CORPORATIONS: MINI-STATES OR PURELY
ECONOMIC ENTITIES?
In the 1970s, would-be corporate law reformers from Ralph Nader to
John Kenneth Galbraith stated that large corporations had become pub-
lic entities and should be regulated by the state as such, perhaps much
like local governmental entities. Seemingly without much thought on the
matter (other than perhaps whether or not their assertions had popular
appeal), these reformers advocated intrusive regulatory schemes such as
federal chartering of corporations 17 or nationalization of large compa-
nies.11 8 Those proposals were a far cry from a much more modest propo-
sal to retain common law, or at least state of the art, fiduciary duties.
Arguments against opt out and other fiduciary duty proposals are also
based upon a more modest view of corporations than that of the 1970s
reformers. Urging some traditional legal protection, in addition to mar-
ket protection, against absolute majority rule is far removed from the
1970s reform advocates' position that corporate law should articulate
management's responsibilities to workers, consumers, suppliers or com-
munities in which the corporation operates, in addition to requiring such
things as clean air and clean water. 19 Nonetheless, some of the debates
of that time are relevant to the present issue of whether the law should in
117. See R. Nader, M. Green & J. Seligman, Taming The Giant Corporation (1976);
Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering For Big Business: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come?, 21 De Paul L. Rev. 915 (1972); Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An
Introduction, 61 Geo. L.J. 71 (1972).
118. See generally J. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose 220 (1973) ("public
ownership is indispensable.., in important parts of the market system where inability to
deploy power and to command resources is the problem").
119. Corporate managers today want many of these notions written into state law,
principally to legitimate tender offer defenses that are not in shareholders' best interests
but may be in some other constituency's interests. For example, Ohio permits a director
to consider the interests of "employees, suppliers, creditors, and customers," "[t]he econ-
omy of the state and the nation," and "[t]he long-term as well as short-term interests of
the corporation.., including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the
continued independence of the corporation." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(E) (An-
derson Supp. 1987). Similarly, the Wisconsin statute provides:
In discharging his or her duties to the corporation and in determining what he
or she believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, a director or officer
may, in addition to considering the effects of any action on shareholders, con-
sider the following: (1) The effects of the action on employees, suppliers and
customers of the corporation. (2) The effects of the action on communities in
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some respects treat corporations as mini-states and import some constitu-
tional content into corporation law, or whether the society would be bet-
ter served by treating companies as purely voluntary associations serving
purely economic ends. 1 20
The issue has been framed by
comparing a shareholder to a citizen of Connecticut, for instance. If
the latter does not like the action of his governor or his legislators,
either he can attempt to vote them out of office... or he can leave the
state. Changing governors or a state assembly is a difficult process at
best, however, and since leaving the state would involve changing jobs
and moving spouse and children, no real alternatives are available.
The shareholder's situation is drastically different. Shares can be sold
easily at the first sign of significant management incompetency or dis-
honesty .... Alternatively, shareholders may consider waging a battle
to change management, although this is an expensive and difficult
strategy .... 12
For significant numbers of shareholders, however, dissociating them-
selves from a company may be nearly as difficult as leaving the state.
These shareholders may be employees as well as investors in the com-
pany. They may be residents of cities and towns in which the company
operates or long-term shareholders who have formed an attachment or
loyalty to that particular company. For these shareholders, "voting with
their feet" may not be an adequate or palatable alternative. Voting with
their feet also may run counter to other values that should be fostered,
such as loyalty to particular enterprises, to equity investment, and to the
corporate sphere generally. Although arbitragers perform useful func-
tions, viewing corporations solely as economic entities leads to an invest-
ment world populated solely by arbitrager-like investors. The benefit
from permitting the elimination of traditional common law safeguards
such as fiduciary duty may not exceed the cost in terms of, among other
things, the lack of legal protections for shareholders who choose not to
sell or whose portfolios are not adequately diversified.
These may not be issues for corporate law at all. The timelessness of
these issues, however, points to their character as normative questions
rather than as issues of positive economics.1 22 Ultimately, the question
which the corporation operates. (3) Any other factors the director or officer
considers pertinent.
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.305 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988).
120. Those issues were involved in the Berle-Dodd debate of the 1930s. See Berle,
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931); Berle, For Whom
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 (1932); Dodd, For
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932); Dodd, Is Effec-
tive Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable, 2 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 194 (1935).
121. N. Wolfson, supra note 8, at 46.
122. See M. Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive
Economics 3, 4 (1953) ("Positive economics is in principle independent of any particular
ethical position or normative judgments. As Keynes says, it deals with 'what is,' not with
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of what legal protections a group such as minority shareholders should
have becomes a question of public choice. A cost-benefit or other eco-
nomic analysis may be very useful and illuminating, but such analysis is
most often only the penultimate and not the ultimate step. Society might
decide that despite the costs and the benefits, for reasons such as notions
of fundamental fairness, moral standards or "common right and reason,"
basic protections such as fiduciary duty should be retained as mandatory.
These are, however, fundamental questions that can only be argued, not
answered, in a law review article. 123
CONCLUSION
Proposals to negate large portions of the common law duty of loyalty
applicable to corporate directors and managers are worrisome. That is
especially so when, in the interest of expediency and certainty in business
dealings, those proposals find adherents such as the august American Bar
Association Committee on Corporate Laws. The public interest and not
the interests of corporate clients must always guide such groups in their
deliberation. Apparently, they have not.
Proposals largely to negate even the fiduciary duty of loyalty thus are
seeing the full light of day. Implementation of those proposals will result
in raw majoritarian rule of American business corporations. Such
supremacy for majoritarian rule will impede the process of capital forma-.
tion and will not be adequately checked by markets and forces operating
within them. Over and above purely economic considerations, the moral
hazard thus created for corporate managers and the moral revulsion cre-
ated among members of the investing public and others in society will be
phenomena of profound socio-political significance. A relatively strin-
gent and rigid common law duty of loyalty should be maintained as the
bedrock beneath and the brackets around the movement toward private
ordering in the affairs of American business corporations.
'what ought to be.' "). While economists seem able to differentiate between the two, a
tendency of lawyer-economists is to treat all questions as positive. Lawyer-economists
treat economics as a natural science whose laws are immutable rather than as the highly
useful but social science it really is. See, e.g., SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers
Report of Recommendations, [Extra Ed.] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1028, at 116-17
(July 15, 1983) (statement of Frank Easterbrook & Gregory Jarrell) (those who oppose
economic analysis viewpoint resemble those through the ages who have questioned "sci-
ence," who do not "sully their hands with data," and whose armchair empiricism "im-
peded economic thought in the same way other 'common-sense' assessments impeded
astronomy, chemistry, physics and biology.").
123. Cf N Wolfson, supra note 8, at 147-48 (reliance on "ministate" and "governmen-
tal analogy," as well as upon duties of care and loyalty rather than upon a purely eco-
nomic view is "seriously deficient in a ... fundamental sense.").
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